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Abstract
Financial services decisions can have enormous conse-
quences for household well-being. Households need a 
range of financial services—to conduct basic transactions, 
such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills; 
to save for emergency needs and long-term goals; to access 
credit; and to insure against life’s key risks. But the financial 
services system is exceedingly complicated and often not 
well-designed to optimize household behavior. In response 
to the complexity of our financial system, there has been a 
long-running debate about the appropriate role and form 
of regulation. Regulation is largely stuck in two competing 
models—disclosure, and usury or product restrictions. 
This paper explores a different approach, based on 
insights from behavioral economics on the one hand, 
and an understanding of industrial organization on the 
other. At the core of the analysis is the interaction between 
individual psychology and market competition. This is in 
contrast to the classic model, which relies on the interac-
tion between rational choice and market competition. The 
introduction of richer psychology complicates the impact 
of competition. It helps us understand that firms compete 
based on how individuals will respond to products in the 
marketplace, and competitive outcomes may not always 
and in all contexts closely align with improved decisional 
choice and increased consumer welfare.
The paper adopts a behavioral economic framework that 
considers firm incentives to respond to regulation. Under 
this framework, outcomes are an equilibrium interaction 
between individuals with specific psychologies and firms 
that respond to those psychologies within specific market 
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contexts. Regulation must then address failures in this 
equilibrium. The model suggests, for example, that in 
some contexts market participants seek to overcome com-
mon human failings (as for example, with under-saving) 
while in other contexts market participants seek to exploit 
these failings (as for example, with over-borrowing). 
Behaviorally informed regulation needs to take account of 
these different contexts. 
The paper discusses the specific application of these 
forces to the case of mortgage, credit card, and banking 
markets. The purpose of this paper is not to champion pol-
icies, but to illustrate how a behaviorally informed regula-
tory analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the 
costs and benefits of specific policies. To further that under-
standing, in particular, the paper discusses ten ideas:
• Full information disclosure to debias home mortgage 
borrowers.
• A new standard for truth in lending.
• A “sticky” opt-out home mortgage system.
• Restructuring the relationship between brokers and 
borrowers.
• Using framing and salience to improve credit card 
disclosures.
• An opt-out payment plan for credit cards.
• An opt-out credit card.
• Regulating of credit card late fees.
• A tax credit for banks offering safe and affordable 
accounts.
• An opt-out bank account for tax refunds.
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In response to the complexity of our financial system, 
there has been a long-running debate about the appro-
priate role and form of regulation. Regulation is largely 
stuck in two competing models—disclosure, and usury 
or product restrictions. Disclosure regulation, embodied 
in the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), presumes one market 
failure: the market will fail to produce a clear and compa-
rable disclosure of essential product information needed 
by consumers. TILA responds, potentially, to two types of 
problems. First, firms will not reveal all information, for 
example, regarding the desirability of various features, that 
borrowers should understand and be able to analyze in 
determining whether to take out a loan. Second, firms will 
not reveal information in a way that facilitates comparabil-
ity across products. The first concern speaks to consumer 
knowledge, “solving” the problem through the provision 
of information; the second concern addresses consumers’ 
ability to process the information, “solving” the problem 
through coordination of terms and definitions. 
Homo economicus is very much the intellectual basis for 
disclosure regulation. The model relies on fully rational 
agents who make intelligent choices. But these neoclassi-
cal assumptions are misplaced and in many contexts con-
sequential. In particular, behavioral research has shown 
that the availability of data does not always lead to commu-
nication and knowledge; understanding and intention do 
not necessarily lead to action; and contextual nuances can 
lead to poor choices. Individuals consistently make choices 
that, they themselves agree, diminish their own well-being 
in significant ways.
Regulation is largely stuck in two competing 
models—disclosure, and usury or product 
restrictions. 
By contrast to disclosure regulation, usury laws and prod-
uct restrictions start from the idea that certain prices 
or products are inherently unreasonable, and that con-
sumers need to be protected from making bad choices. 
But product regulation may in some contexts diminish 
access to credit or reduce innovation of financial prod-
ucts. Moreover, for certain types of individuals, some 
limitations may themselves increase consumer confu-
sion regarding what rules apply to which products, and 
what products may prove beneficial or harmful. In addi-
tion, firms will likely develop ways around such product 
restrictions, undermining their core intention, increasing 
costs and further confusing consumers.
Financial services decisions can have enormous consequences for household well-
being. Households need a range of financial services—to conduct basic transac-
tions, such as receiving their income, storing it, and paying bills; to save for emer-
gency needs and long-term goals; to access credit; and to insure against life’s key 
risks. But the financial services system is exceedingly complicated and often not 
well-designed to optimize household behavior. For example, choosing a mortgage 
is one of the biggest financial decisions an American consumer will make, but it 
can be a complicated one, especially in today’s environment where the terms and 
features of mortgages vary in multiple dimensions. Similarly, credit card contracts 
now often involve complicated terms and features that may encourage sub-opti-
mal borrowing behavior. And it has long been remarked that households fail to 
optimize in their savings decisions. 
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Our work is clearly related to the emerging literature on 
behaviorally informed policy-making. This literature pro-
duces novel considerations in the design and implementa-
tion of regulation, including features such as the framing 
of information, the setting of defaults or “opt-out” rules, 
the provision of warnings, and other strategies to alter indi-
vidual behavior.2 In this paper, we embed this thinking 
more deeply in the logic of markets. Specifically, we adopt a 
framework that considers in more depth firm incentives to 
respond to behaviorally motivated regulation. We envision 
outcomes as an equilibrium interaction between individuals 
with specific psychologies and firms that respond to those 
psychologies within specific market contexts. Regulation 
must then address failures in this equilibrium. 
This perspective produces two dimensions to consider. 
First, the psychological biases of individuals can either help 
or hurt the firms they interact with; hence firms’ and pub-
lic-minded regulators’ interests are sometimes mis-aligned 
and sometimes not. Let us take the example of a consumer 
who does not understand the profound effects of the com-
pounding of interest. Such a bias would lead the individual 
both to under-save, and to over-borrow. Society would prefer 
that the individual did not have such a bias in both contexts. 
Firms, however, would prefer that the individual not have 
the bias to under-save so that funds available for investment 
and fee generation would not diminish but, at least over the 
short term (and excluding consideration of collection costs), 
would be perfectly content to see the same individual over-
borrow. Because people are fallible and easily misled, trans-
parency does not always pay off and firms sometimes have 
strong incentives to exacerbate psychological biases by hid-
ing borrowing costs. Regulation in this case faces a much 
more difficult challenge than in the savings situation. 
The psychological biases of individuals can 
either help or hurt the firms they interact 
with; hence firms’ and public-minded regu-
lators’ interests are sometimes mis-aligned 
and sometimes not. 
The market response to individual failure can profoundly 
affect regulation. In attempting to boost participation 
in 401(k) retirement plans, the regulator faces at worst 
We explore a different approach, based on insights from 
behavioral economics on the one hand, and an understand-
ing of industrial organization on the other. At the core of our 
analysis is the interaction between individual psychology and 
market competition. This is in contrast to the classic model, 
which relies on the interaction between rational choice and 
market competition. In the classic model, absent market 
failures, because rational agents choose well, firms compete 
to provide products that improve welfare. Because rational 
agents process information well, firms compete to provide 
information that improves decision quality. By contrast, in 
our model, individuals depart from neo-classical assump-
tions in important ways. The introduction of richer psychol-
ogy complicates the impact of competition. Now, firms com-
pete based on how actual individuals will respond to products 
in the marketplace, and actual competitive outcomes may 
not always and in all contexts closely align with improved 
decisional choice and increased consumer welfare. 
We explore a different approach, based on 
insights from behavioral economics on the 
one hand, and an understanding of indus-
trial organization on the other. 
In the home mortgage market, for example, the standard 
model assumes that people evaluate options well, and that 
the more options people have, the better. Firms will thus 
provide more options, people will pick the best ones, and 
healthy competition will drive out bad options. In reality, 
people are easily overwhelmed by too many options and 
make mistakes, often in predictable ways. Borrowers, for 
example, might pick the most salient dimension (lowest 
monthly cost) rather than focusing on their cost of credit 
over the expected life of their loan—or the fact that taxes 
and insurance will not be escrowed and are not included in 
the monthly cost. Consequently, firms can and will intro-
duce options that cater to these behaviors, and people will 
pick options that carry a greater likelihood of failure than 
anticipated, and which they themselves would find sub-
optimal upon further reflection and analysis. These behav-
ioral considerations suggest that disclosure of information 
alone will often be insufficient to provide consumers with 
what is needed to optimize their understanding and deci-
sion-making, and the resulting outcomes.
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indifferent and at best positively inclined employers seek-
ing to boost employee retention and to comply with federal 
pension rules.3 In forcing disclosure of hidden prices of 
credit, by contrast, the regulator often faces non-coopera-
tive firms, whose interests are to find ways to work around 
or undo interventions. 
A second implication of our equilibrium model of firms in 
particular markets interacting with individuals with specific 
psychologies is that the mode of regulation chosen should 
take account of this interaction. One might think of the reg-
ulator as holding two different levers, which we describe as 
changing the rules and changing the scoring.4 When forcing 
disclosure of the APR, for example, the regulator effectively 
changes the “rules” of the game: what a firm must say. A 
stronger form of rule change is product regulation: chang-
ing what a firm must do. Behavioral rule changes, such as 
creating a favored starting position or default, fall between 
these two types. When changing liability or providing tax 
incentives, by contrast, the regulator changes the way the 
game is “scored”. Typically, changing the rules of the game 
without changing the scoring maintains the firms’ original 
incentives to help or hurt consumer bias, channeling the 
incentive into different behaviors by firms or individuals. 
In contrast, changing the scoring of the game (as through 
liability changes) can alter those incentives. 
This perspective highlights the care that must be taken 
when transferring the insights of the most prominent 
example of behavioral regulation—defaults in 401(k) par-
ticipation—to other domains. According to the present 
analysis, changing the rules on retirement saving (by intro-
ducing defaults) works well because employers’ incentives 
align (or do not mis-align) with regulatory efforts to guide 
individual choice. In other words, under current condi-
tions, employers are either unaffected or may even be hurt 
by individuals’ propensity to under-save in 401(k) plans.5 
They thus will not lean against an attempt to fix that prob-
lem. In contrast, in circumstances where firms’ incentives 
misalign with regulatory intent, changing the rules alone 
may not work well since firms may have the ability to work 
creatively around those rule changes. Under those condi-
tions, psychological rules such as defaults or framing may 
be too weak, and changes in liability rules or other mea-
sures may be necessary, as we explain below.
This distinction in market responses to individual psychol-
ogy is central to our framework and is illustrated in Table 
1. In some cases, the market is either neutral or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility. In other cases, the market 
would like to exploit or exaggerate consumer fallibility. 
The different provider incentives generated by consumer 
lack of understanding about the compounding of interest 
in the saving and borrowing contexts is discussed above. 
Similarly, when consumers procrastinate in signing up 
for the EITC (and hence in filing for taxes) private tax 
preparation firms have incentives to help remove this pro-
crastination so as to increase their customer base. When 
Behavioral Fallibility
Market  neutral and/or wants to 
overcome consumer fallibility
Market exploits consumer fallibility
Consumers misunderstand 
compounding
Consumers misunderstand 
compounding in savings 
› Banks would like to reduce this to 
increase savings base
Consumers misunderstand 
compounding in borrowing 
› Banks would like to exploit this to 
increase borrowing
Consumers procrastinate
Consumers procrastinate in signing 
up for EITC 
› Tax filing companies would like to 
reduce this so as to increase number 
of customers
Consumers procrastinate in returning 
rebates 
› Retailers would like to exploit this to 
increase revenues
Table 1. The Firm and the Individual
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Table 2. Changing the Game
Rules
Set the defaults in 401(k) savings
Organ donation
Scoring
401(k) top heavy requirements for tax
Grants to states that enroll organ donors
Table 3 weaves these two dimensions together, illustrat-
ing how regulatory choice ought to be analyzed accord-
ing to the market’s stance towards human fallibility. In 
what follows, we discuss the specific application of these 
forces to the case of mortgage, credit card, and banking 
markets, with specific proposals that fall into each bin. 
Among other things, the discussion illustrates how poli-
cies in the top-right-hand corner of Table 3 face a par-
ticular challenge. Changing the rules of the game alone 
will be difficult when firms are highly motivated to find 
work-arounds. As such, when we suggest opt-out policies 
in mortgages below, the challenge will be to find ways to 
make these starting positions “sticky” so that firms do not 
simply undo their default nature. In our judgment, both 
achieving a good default and figuring out how to make it 
work requires separating low-road from high road firms 
and making it profitable for high road firms to offer 
the default product (for a related concept, see Kennedy, 
2005). For that to work, the default must be sufficiently 
attractive to consumers, sufficiently profitable for “high 
road” firms to succeed in offering it, and penalties associ-
ated with deviations from the default must be sufficiently 
costly so as to make the default “stick” even in the face of 
market pressures from “low road” firms. It may be that 
in some credit markets, low road firms have become so 
dominant that “sticky” defaults will be ineffectual. 
The default must be sufficiently attractive to 
consumers, sufficiently profitable for “high 
road” firms to succeed in offering it, and 
penalties associated with deviations from the 
default must be sufficiently costly so as to 
make the default “stick” even in the face of 
market pressures from “low road” firms. 
consumers procrastinate in returning rebates (but make 
retail purchases as if they are going to get a rebate), retail-
ers benefit. Note the parallelism in these examples: firm 
incentives to alleviate or exploit a bias are not an intrinsic 
feature of the bias itself. Instead, they are a function of how 
the bias plays itself out in the particular market structure. 
In the consumer credit market, one worries that many 
firm-individual interactions are of the kind where firms 
seek to exploit rather than alleviate bias. If true, this 
raises the concern of over-extrapolating from the 401(k) 
defaults example to credit products. To the extent that 
401(k) defaults work because optimal behavior is largely 
aligned with market incentives, other areas, such as credit 
markets, might be more difficult to regulate with mere 
defaults. Furthermore, if the credit market is dominated 
by “low-road” firms offering opaque products that “prey” 
on human weakness, it is more likely that regulators of such 
a market will be captured because “high road” interests are 
too weak to push back against “low road” players; that mar-
ket forces will defeat positive defaults sets; and that “low-
road” players will continue to dominate. Many observers, for 
example, believe that the credit card markets are, in fact, cur-
rently dominated by such “low road” firms (see, e.g., Mann 
2007; Bar-Gill 2004) and that formerly “high road” players 
have come to adopt the sharp practices of their low-road 
competitors. If government policy makers want to attempt 
to use defaults in such contexts, they might need to deploy 
“stickier” defaults or more aggressive policy options. 
Table 2 illustrates a conceptual approach to the issue of 
regulatory choice. In this stylized model, the regulator can 
either change the rules of the game or change the scoring 
of the game. Setting a default is an example of changing the 
rules of the game, as is disclosure regulation. Specifically, 
the rules of the game are changed when there’s an attempt 
to change the nature of firm-individual interactions, as 
when the regulation attempts to affect what can be said, 
offered or done. Changing the scoring of the game, by con-
trast, changes the payoffs a firm will receive for particular 
outcomes. This may be done without a particular rule about 
how the outcome is to be achieved. For example, pension 
regulation that penalizes firms whose 401(k) plan enroll-
ment is top-heavy with high-paid executives is an example 
of how scoring gives firms incentives to enroll low-income 
individuals without setting particular rules on how this is 
done. Changing rules and changing scoring often accom-
pany each other, but they are conceptually distinct. 
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Instead, we illustrate how a behaviorally informed regula-
tory analysis would lead to a deeper understanding of the 
costs and benefits of specific policies. We explore ten ideas 
to illustrate our conceptual approach in three main areas of 
borrowing and saving: home mortgage regulation, credit 
card regulation, and the provision of bank accounts.
 
Behaviorally Informed Home 
Mortgage Regulation
Full Information Disclosure to Debias Borrowers
With the advent of nationwide credit reporting systems and 
refinement of credit scoring and modeling, the creditor and 
broker know information about the borrower that the bor-
rower does not necessarily know about himself, including 
not just his credit score, but his likely performance regard-
ing a particular set of loan products. Creditors will know 
whether the borrower could qualify for a better, cheaper 
loan, as well as the likelihood that the borrower will meet his 
obligations under the existing mortgage, or become delin-
quent, refinance, default or go into foreclosure. Yet lenders 
are not required to reveal this information to borrowers. 
At the same time, the lack of disclosure of such informa-
tion is likely exacerbated by consumer beliefs. Consumers 
likely have false background assumptions regarding what 
brokers and creditors reveal to them about their borrowing 
status. What if consumers believe the following: 
“Creditors reveal all information about me 
and the loan products I am qualified to receive. 
Brokers work for me in finding me the best loan 
for my purposes, and lenders offer me the best 
loans for which I qualify. I must be qualified for 
the loan I have been offered, or the lender would 
not have validated the choice by offering me the 
loan. Because I am qualified for the loan that must 
mean that the lender thinks that I can repay the 
loan. Why else would they lend me the money? 
Moreover, the government tightly regulates home 
mortgages; they make the lender give me all these 
legal forms. Surely the government must regulate 
all aspects of this transaction.” 
In reality, the government does not regulate as the borrower 
believes, and the lender does not necessarily behave as the 
borrower hopes. Instead, information is hidden from the 
borrower, information that would improve market compe-
Moreover, achieving such a default is likely more costly 
than making defaults work when market incentives align, 
not least because the costs associated with the stickiness 
of the default involve greater dead-weight losses given that 
there will be higher costs to opt-out for those for whom 
deviating from the default is optimal. These losses would 
need to be weighed against the losses from the current sys-
tem, as well as against losses from alternative approaches, 
such as disclosure or product regulation. Nonetheless, 
given the considerations above, it seems worth exploring 
whether such “sticky” defaults can help to transform con-
sumer financial markets. 
Table 3. Behaviorally Informed Regulation
Market neutral 
and/or wants to 
overcome con-
sumer fallibility
Market exploits con-
sumer fallibility
Rules
Public education 
on saving 
Direct deposit/
auto-save 
Licensing
Opt-out mortgage or 
credit card 
Information debiasing 
on debt (full informa-
tion disclosure, payoff 
time for credit cards) 
Scoring
Tax incentives 
for savings 
vehicles 
IRS Direct 
Deposit 
Accounts
Penalties to make opt-
out system sticky 
Ex post liability 
standard for truth in 
lending 
Broker fiduciary duty 
and/or changing 
compensation (Yield 
Spread Premiums) 
The default example is just one of a set of examples we 
discuss as potential regulatory interventions based on 
our conceptual framework. As noted above, given market 
responses to relevant psychological factors in different 
contexts, regulation may need to take a variety of forms, 
including some that while informed by psychology are not 
designed to affect behavioral change but rather to alter 
the structure of the market in which relevant choices are 
made. Given the complexities involved, the purpose of this 
white paper is not to champion the specific policies below. 
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rent crisis in the subprime mortgage sector suggests may 
have occurred. If competition does not produce informa-
tive disclosure, disclosure regulation might be necessary. 
But simply because disclosure regulation is needed does 
not mean it will work. Regulating disclosure appropriately 
is difficult and requires substantial sophistication by regu-
lators, including psychological insight. 
A behavioral perspective could focus on improving disclo-
sures themselves. The goal of disclosure should be to improve 
the quality of information about contract terms in mean-
ingful ways. That would suggest, for example, that simply 
adding information is unlikely to work. Disclosure policies 
are effective to the extent that they present a frame—a way 
of perceiving the disclosure—that is both well understood 
and conveys salient information that helps the decision-
maker act optimally. It is possible, for example, that infor-
mation about the failure frequency of of particular products 
might help (“2 out of 10 borrowers who take this kind of 
loan default”), but proper framing can be difficult to achieve 
and to maintain consistently, given that it may vary across 
situations. Moreover, the attempt to improve decision qual-
ity through an improvement in consumer understanding, 
which is presumed to change the consumer’s intentions to 
act, and finally her actual actions, is fraught with difficulty. 
There is often a gap between understanding and intention, 
and particularly between intention and action. 
Disclosure policies are effective to the extent 
that they present a frame—a way of perceiv-
ing the disclosure—that is both well under-
stood and conveys salient information that 
helps the decision-maker act optimally. 
Furthermore, even if meaningful disclosure rules can be 
created, sellers can undermine whatever before-the-fact 
or ex ante disclosure rule is established, in some contexts 
simply by “complying” with it: “Here’s the disclosure 
form I’m supposed to give you, just sign here.” For exam-
ple, with rules-based ex ante disclosure requirements 
for credit, such as TILA, the rule is set up first, and the 
firm (the discloser) moves last. While an ex ante rule pro-
vides certainty to creditors, whatever gave the discloser 
incentives to confuse consumers remains in the face of 
tition and outcomes. Given the consumer’s probably false 
background assumptions and the reality of asymmetric 
information favoring the lender and broker, we suggest 
that creditors be required to reveal useful information to 
the borrower at the time of the mortgage loan offer, includ-
ing disclosure of the borrower’s credit score, and the bor-
rower’s qualifications for the all of the lender’s mortgage 
products. Brokers could even be required to reveal the 
wholesale rate sheet pricing—the rates at which lenders 
would be willing to lend to this type of borrower. Such an 
approach corresponds to the use of debiasing information, 
in the top right of Table 3.
Given the consumer’s probably false back-
ground assumptions and the reality of asym-
metric information favoring the lender and 
broker, we suggest that creditors be required 
to reveal useful information to the borrower 
at the time of the mortgage loan offer, includ-
ing disclosure of the borrower’s credit score, 
and the borrower’s qualifications for the all 
of the lender’s mortgage products.
The goal of these disclosures would be to put pressure on 
creditors and brokers to be honest in their dealings with 
applicants. The additional information might improve com-
parison shopping and perhaps outcomes. Of course, reveal-
ing such information would also reduce broker and creditor 
profit margins. But if the classic market competition story 
relies on full information, and assumes rational behavior 
based on understanding, one can view this proposal as 
simply attempting to remove market frictions from infor-
mation failures, and move the market competition model 
more towards its ideal. By reducing information asymme-
try, full information disclosure would help to debias con-
sumers and lead to better competitive outcomes.
Ex Post Standards-based Truth in Lending
Optimal disclosure will not simply occur in all markets 
through competition alone. Competition under a range of 
plausible scenarios will not necessarily generate psycho-
logically informative and actionable disclosure, as the cur-
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ing a more salient term (“lower monthly cost!”) to compete 
with the APR for borrowers’ attention. Under an ex post 
standards approach, by contrast, lenders could not plead 
compliance with TILA as a defense. Rather, the question 
would be one of objective reasonableness: whether the 
lender meaningfully conveyed the information required for 
a typical consumer to make a reasonable judgment about 
the loan. Standards would also lower the cost of specifica-
tion ex ante. Clarity of contract is hard to specify ex ante but 
easier to verify ex post. Over time, through agency action, 
guidance, model disclosures, “no action” letters, and court 
decisions, the parameters of the reasonableness standard 
would become known and predictable.
While TILA has significant short-comings, we do not pro-
pose abandoning it. Rather, TILA would remain (with what-
ever useful modifications to it might be gleaned from our 
increased understanding of consumers’ emotions, thought 
processes and behaviors). Quite recently, for example, the 
Federal Reserve Board unveiled major and useful changes 
to its disclosure rules, based in part on consumer research.6 
TILA would still be important in permitting comparison-
shopping among mortgage products, one of its two central 
goals. However, some of the burden of TILA’s second goal, 
to induce firms to reveal information that would promote 
better consumer understanding, would be shifted to the ex 
post standard. 
Of course, there would be significant costs to such an 
approach, especially at first. Litigation or regulatory enforce-
ment would impose direct costs and the uncertainty sur-
rounding enforcement of the standard ex post might deter 
innovation in the development of mortgage products. The 
additional costs of compliance with a disclosure standard 
might reduce lenders’ willingness to develop new mort-
gage products designed to reach lower-income or minor-
ity borrowers who might not be served by the firms’ plain 
vanilla products. The lack of clear rules might also increase 
consumer confusion regarding how to compare innovative 
mortgage products to each other, even while it increases con-
sumer understanding of the particular mortgage products 
being offered. Even if one couples the advantages of TILA 
for mortgage comparisons with the advantages of an ex post 
standard for disclosure in promoting clarity, the net result 
may simply be greater confusion with respect to cross-loan 
comparisons. That is, if consumer confusion results mostly 
from firm obfuscation, then our proposal will likely help a 
good deal. By contrast, if consumer confusion in this context 
the regulation. While officially complying with the rule, 
there is market pressure to find other means to avoid the 
salutary effects on consumer decisions that the disclosure 
was intended to achieve. 
In light of the difficulties of addressing such issues ex ante, 
we propose that policy makers consider shifting away from 
sole reliance on a rules-based, ex ante regulatory structure 
for disclosure embodied in TILA and toward integration 
of an ex-post, standards-based disclosure requirement as 
well. Rather than a rule, we would deploy a standard, and 
rather than an ex ante decision about content, we would 
permit the standard to be enforced after loans are made. 
In essence, courts or expert agencies would determine 
whether the disclosure would have, under common under-
standing, effectively communicated the key terms of the 
mortgage to the typical borrower. This approach could be 
similar to ex post determinations of reasonableness of dis-
claimers of warranties in sales contracts under UCC 2-316 
(See White & Summers, 1995). This type of policy inter-
vention would correspond to a change in “scoring,” in the 
lower right of Table 3.
We propose that policy makers consider 
shifting away from sole reliance on a rules-
based, ex ante regulatory structure for disclo-
sure embodied in TILA and toward integra-
tion of an ex-post, standards-based disclosure 
requirement as well. 
In our judgment, an ex post version of truth in lending 
based on a reasonable person standard to complement 
the fixed disclosure rule under TILA might permit inno-
vation—both in products themselves and in strategies of 
disclosure—while minimizing rule evasion. An ex-post 
standard with sufficient teeth could change the incentives 
of firms to confuse and would be more difficult to evade. 
Under the current approach, creditors can easily “evade” 
TILA, by simultaneously complying with its actual terms 
while making the required disclosures regarding the terms 
effectively useless in the context of the borrowing decisions 
of consumers with limited attention and understanding. 
TILA, for example, does not block a creditor from introduc-
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margin, or can judge whether the prepayment penalty will 
offset the gains from the teaser rate?
Improved disclosures might help. Altering the rules of the 
game of disclosure, and altering the “scoring” for seeking 
to evade proper disclosure, may be sufficient to reduce the 
worst outcomes. However, if market pressures and con-
sumer confusion are sufficiently strong, such disclosure 
may not be enough. If market complexity is sufficiently dis-
ruptive to consumer choice, product regulation might prove 
most appropriate. For example, by barring prepayment pen-
alties, one could reduce lock-in to bad mortgages; by barring 
short-term ARMs and balloon payments, one could reduce 
refinance pressure; in both cases, more of the cost of the loan 
would be pushed into interest rates and competition could 
focus on a consistently stated price in the form of the APR. 
Price competition would benefit consumers, who would be 
more likely to understand the terms on which lenders were 
competing. Product regulation would also reduce cognitive 
and emotional pressures related to potentially bad decision-
making by reducing the number of choices and eliminating 
loan features that put pressure on borrowers to refinance on 
bad terms. However, product regulation may stifle benefi-
cial innovation and there is always the possibility that gov-
ernment may simply get it wrong.
For that reason, we propose a new form of regulation. We 
propose that a default be established with increased liabil-
ity exposure for deviations that harm consumers. For lack 
of a better term, we call this a “sticky” opt-out mortgage 
system.12 As with “opt out” regulation generally, a “sticky” 
opt out system would fall, in terms of stringency, some-
where between product regulation and disclosure; how-
ever, for reasons we explain below, market forces would 
likely swamp a pure “opt out” regime—that’s where the 
need for stickiness comes in. This approach corresponds 
to a combination of changing the rules of the game, in the 
top right of Table 3, and changing liability rules, at the bot-
tom right of that table. 
We propose that a default be established with 
increased liability exposure for deviations that 
harm consumers. For lack of a better term, we 
call this a “sticky” opt-out mortgage system.
results mostly from market complexity in product innovation, 
then the proposal is unlikely to make a major difference, and 
other approaches focused on loan comparisons might be 
warranted (see, e.g., Thaler & Sunstein (2008)). 
Despite the shortcomings of an ex post standard for truth 
in lending, we believe that such an approach is worth pur-
suing. To limit the costs associated with our approach, the 
ex post determination of reasonableness could be signifi-
cantly confined. For example, if courts are to be involved 
in enforcement, the ex post standard for reasonableness 
of disclosure might be limited to providing a (partial) 
defense to payment in foreclosure or bankruptcy, rather 
than being open to broader enforcement through affirma-
tive suit. Alternatively, rather than court enforcement, the 
ex post standard might be enforced by the bank regulators 
or another expert consumer agency,7 through supervision 
and enforcement actions. The ex post exposure might be 
significantly reduced through ex ante steps. For example, 
regulators might develop safe harbors for reasonable dis-
closures, issue model disclosures, use “no action” letters to 
provide certainty to lenders, and the like. Moreover, firms 
might be tasked with conducting regular surveys of borrow-
ers or conducting experimental design research to validate 
their disclosures, with positive results from the research 
providing rebuttable presumptions of reasonableness, or 
even safe harbors from challenge. The key is to give the 
standard sufficient teeth without deterring innovation. The 
precise contours of enforcement and liability are not essen-
tial to the concept, and weighing the costs and benefits of 
such penalties is beyond the scope of what we hope to do 
in introducing the idea here. Further work will be required 
to detail the design for implementation.
“Sticky” Opt-Out Mortgage Regulation
While the causes of the mortgage crisis are myriad, a cen-
tral problem was that many borrowers took out loans that 
they did not understand and could not afford. Brokers and 
lenders offered loans that looked much less expensive than 
they really were, because of low initial monthly payments 
and hidden, costly features. Families commonly make 
mistakes in taking out home mortgages because they are 
misled by broker sales tactics, misunderstand the compli-
cated terms and financial tradeoffs in mortgages, wrongly 
forecast their own behavior and misperceive their risks 
of borrowing. How many homeowners really understand 
how the teaser rate, introductory rate and reset rate relate 
to the London interbank offered rate plus some specified 
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Deviation from the offer would require 
heightened disclosures and additional legal 
exposure for lenders in order to make the 
default “sticky.” 
Future work will need to explore in greater detail the 
enforcement mechanism. For example, under one poten-
tial approach to making the opt-out “sticky,” if default 
occurs when a borrower opts out, the borrower could raise 
the lack of reasonable disclosure as a defense to bankruptcy 
or foreclosure. Using an objective reasonableness standard 
akin to that used for warranty analysis under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, if the court determined that the dis-
closure would not effectively communicate the key terms 
and risks of the mortgage to the typical borrower, the court 
could modify or rescind the loan contract.8 Another alter-
native would be to have the banking agencies (or another 
expert consumer agency) enforce the requirement on a 
supervisory basis, rather than relying on the courts. The 
agency would be responsible for supervising the nature 
of disclosures according to a reasonableness standard, 
and would impose a fine on the lender and order correc-
tive actions if the disclosures were found to be unreason-
able. The precise nature of the “stickiness” required and 
the tradeoffs involved in imposing these costs on lenders 
would need to be explored in greater detail, but in prin-
ciple, a “sticky” opt-out policy could effectively leverage the 
behavioral insight that defaults matter with the industrial 
organizational insight that certain market incentives work 
against a pure opt-out policy. 
A “sticky” opt-out policy could effectively 
leverage the behavioral insight that defaults 
matter with the industrial organizational 
insight that certain market incentives work 
against a pure opt-out policy.
An opt-out mortgage system with “stickiness” might pro-
vide several benefits over current market outcomes. Under 
the plan, a plain vanilla set of default mortgages would be 
The proposal is grounded in our equilibrium model of firm 
incentives and individual psychology. Borrowers may be 
unable to distinguish among complex loan products and 
act optimally based on such an understanding (see, e.g., 
Ausubel 1991). We thus deploy an opt-out strategy to make 
it easier for borrowers to choose a standard product, and 
harder for borrowers to choose a product that they are less 
likely to understand. At the same time, lenders may seek 
to extract surplus from borrowers because of asymmetric 
information about future income or default probabilities 
(see Musto 2007), and, in the short term, lenders and bro-
kers may benefit from selling borrowers loans they can-
not afford. Thus, a pure default would be undermined by 
firms, and regulation needs to take account of this market 
pressure by pushing back. 
In our model, lenders would be required to offer eligible 
borrowers a standard mortgage (or set of mortgages), such 
as a fixed rate, self-amortizing 30 year mortgage loan, 
according to reasonable underwriting standards. The pre-
cise contours of the standard set of mortgages would be 
set by regulation. Lenders would be free to charge what-
ever interest rate they wanted on the loan, and, subject to 
the constraints outlined below, could offer whatever other 
loan products they wanted outside of the standard pack-
age. Borrowers, however, would get the standard mortgage 
offered, unless they chose to opt out in favor of a non-stan-
dard option offered by the lender, after honest and com-
prehensible disclosures from brokers or lenders about the 
terms and risks of the alternative mortgages. An opt-out 
mortgage system would mean borrowers would be more 
likely to get straightforward loans they could understand.
But for the reasons cited above, a plain-vanilla opt-out policy 
is likely to be inadequate. Unlike the savings context, where 
market incentives align well with policies to overcome behav-
ioral biases, in the context of credit markets, firms often have 
an incentive to hide the true costs of borrowing. Given the 
strong market pressures to deviate from the default offer, 
we would need to require more than a simple “opt out” to 
make the default “sticky” enough to make a difference in 
outcomes. Deviation from the offer would require height-
ened disclosures and additional legal exposure for lenders 
in order to make the default “sticky.” Under our plan, lend-
ers would have stronger incentives to provide meaningful 
disclosures to those whom they convince to opt out, because 
they would face increased regulatory scrutiny, or increased 
costs if the loans did not work out. 
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offer home mortgage products that better serve borrowers. 
For this to work effectively, the default—and the efforts to 
make the default sticky—would need to enable the con-
sumer easily to distinguish the typical “good” loan, ben-
efiting both lender and borrower, which would be offered 
as the default, from a wide range of “bad” loans, includ-
ing those that benefit the lender with higher rates and fees 
but harm the borrower; those that benefit the borrower but 
harm the lender; and those that harm the borrower and 
lender but benefit third parties, such as brokers.
There will be costs associated with requiring an opt-out 
home mortgage. For example, the sticky defaults may not 
be sticky enough to alter outcomes, given market pres-
sures. The default could be undermined, as well, through 
the firm’s incentive structures for loan officers and bro-
kers, which could provide greater rewards for non-stan-
dard loans. Implementation of the measure may be costly 
and the disclosure requirement and uncertainty regarding 
enforcement of the standard might reduce overall access to 
home mortgage lending. There may be too many cases in 
which alternative products are optimal, so that the default 
product is in essence “incorrect,” and comes to be seen as 
such. The default would then matter less over time, and 
forcing firms and consumers to go through the process of 
deviating from it would become increasingly just another 
burden (like existing disclosure paperwork) along the road 
to getting a home mortgage loan. Low-income, minority 
or first-time homeowners who have benefited from more 
flexible underwriting and more innovative mortgage 
developments might see their access reduced if the stan-
dard set of mortgages does not include products suitable 
to their needs.
One could improve these outcomes in a variety of ways. 
For example, the opt-out regulation could require that the 
standard set of mortgages include a 30-year fixed mort-
gage, a five- or seven-year adjustable rate mortgage, and 
straightforward mortgages designed to meet the particu-
lar needs of first-time, minority or low-income homeown-
ers. One might develop “smart defaults,” based on key 
borrower characteristics, such as income and age. With a 
handful of key facts, an optimal default might be offered 
to an individual borrower. The optimal default would con-
sist of a mortgage or set of mortgages that most closely 
align with the set of mortgages that the typical borrower 
with that income, age, and education would prefer. For 
example, a borrower with rising income prospects might 
easier to compare across mortgage offers. Information 
would be more efficiently transmitted across the market. 
Consumers would be likely to understand the key terms 
and features of such standard products better than they 
would alternative mortgage products. Price competition 
would more likely be salient once features are standard-
ized. Behaviorally, when alternative products are intro-
duced, the consumer would be made aware that such 
alternatives represent deviations from the default, helping 
to anchor consumers in the terms of the default product 
and providing some basic expectations for what ought to 
enter into consumer choice. Framing the mortgage choice 
as one between accepting a standard mortgage offer and 
needing affirmatively to choose a non-standard product 
should improve consumer decision-making. Creditors will 
be required to make heightened disclosures about the risks 
of the alternative loan products for the borrower, subject 
to legal sanction in the event of failure reasonably to dis-
close such risks; the legal sanctions should deter creditors 
from making highly unreasonable alternative offers, with 
hidden and complicated terms. Consumers may be less 
likely to make significant mistakes. In contrast to a pure 
product regulation approach, the sticky default approach 
would allow lenders to continue to develop new kinds of 
mortgages, but only when they can adequately explain key 
terms and risks to borrowers. 
Requiring a default to be offered, accom-
panied by required heightened disclosures 
and increased legal exposure for deviations, 
may help to make “high road” lending more 
profitable in relation to “low road” lending—
at least if deviations resulting in harm are 
appropriately penalized.
Moreover, requiring a default to be offered, accompanied by 
required heightened disclosures and increased legal expo-
sure for deviations, may help to make “high road” lending 
more profitable in relation to “low road” lending—at least 
if deviations resulting in harm are appropriately penalized. 
If offering an opt-out mortgage product helps to split the 
market between high and low-road firms, and rewards the 
former, the market may shift (back) towards firms that 
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agencies would need to be provided with the authority 
and resources to conduct ongoing supervisory and testing 
functions for non-depositories, instead of relying solely on 
enforcement actions. Through these no action letters, safe 
harbors, supervision, and other regulatory guidance, the 
regulators can develop a body of law that would increase 
compliance across the diverse financial sectors involved in 
mortgage lending, while reducing the uncertainty facing 
lenders from the new opt-out requirement, and providing 
greater freedom for financial innovation.
Restructure the Relationship Between 
Brokers and Borrowers
An alternative approach to addressing the problem of mar-
ket incentives to exploit behavioral biases would be to focus 
directly on restructuring brokers’ duties to borrowers and 
reforming compensation schemes that provide incentives 
to brokers to mislead borrowers. Mortgage brokers have 
dominated the subprime market. Brokers generally have 
been compensated with “yield spread premiums” (YSP) 
for getting borrowers to pay higher rates than those for 
which the borrower would qualify. Such YSPs have been 
used widely.9 In loans with yield spread premiums, unlike 
other loans, there is wide dispersion in prices paid to mort-
gage brokers. As Howell Jackson has shown, within the 
group of borrowers paying yield spread premiums, African 
Americans paid $474 more for their loans, and Hispanics 
$590 more, than white borrowers; thus, even if minority 
and white borrowers could qualify for the same rate, in 
practice minority borrowers are likely to pay much more.10 
An alternative approach to addressing the 
problem of market incentives to exploit 
behavioral biases would be to focus directly 
on restructuring brokers’ duties to borrowers 
and reforming compensation schemes that 
provide incentives to brokers to mislead bor-
rowers. Mortgage brokers have dominated 
the subprime market. 
Brokers cannot be monitored sufficiently by borrowers 
(See Jackson & Burlingame), and it is dubious that addi-
tional disclosures would help borrowers be better monitors 
appropriately be offered a five-year adjustable rate mort-
gage. Smart defaults might reduce error costs associated 
with the proposal and increase the range of mortgages that 
can be developed to meet the needs of a broad range of bor-
rowers, including lower-income or first-time homeowners; 
however, smart defaults may add to consumer confusion. 
Even if the consumer (with the particular characteristics 
encompassed by the smart default) only faces one default 
product, spillover from too many options across the mar-
ket may make decision-making more difficult. Moreover, 
it may be difficult to design smart defaults consistent with 
fair lending rules. 
The opt-out regulation could require that the 
standard set of mortgages include a 30-year 
fixed mortgage, a five- or seven-year adjust-
able rate mortgage, and straightforward 
mortgages designed to meet the particular 
needs of first-time, minority or low-income 
homeowners. 
Another approach to improve the standard mortgage choice 
set and to reduce enforcement costs over time, would be 
to build in banking agency supervision as well as periodic 
required reviews of the defaults, with consumer experi-
mental design or survey research to test both the prod-
ucts and the disclosures, so that the disclosures and the 
default products stay current with updated knowledge of 
outcomes in the home mortgage market. Indeed, lenders 
might be required to conduct such research and to disclose 
the results to regulators and the public upon developing a 
new product and its related disclosures. In addition, regu-
lators might use the results of the research to provide safe 
harbors for disclosures that are shown to be reasonable ex 
ante through these methods. Regulators could also issue 
“no action” letters regarding disclosures that are deemed 
to be reasonable through such research. The appropriate 
federal and state supervisory agencies could be required 
to conduct ongoing supervision and testing of compliance 
with the opt-out regulations and disclosure requirements. 
The federal and state banking agencies could easily adapt 
to this additional role with respect to depositories, while 
the FTC, a new expert consumer finance agency, or state 
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incentive for brokers to seek out higher-cost loans for cus-
tomers. In fact, quite recently a number of lenders have 
moved away from YSPs to fixed fees with some funds held 
back until the loan has performed well for a period of time, 
precisely because of broker conflicts of interest in seeking 
higher YSPs rather than sound loans. Banning YSPs now 
would reinforce these “high road’ practices, and protect 
against a renewed and profitable “low road” push for using 
YSPs to increase market share once stability is restored to 
mortgage markets. Banning YSPs would constitute a form 
of scoring change, corresponding to regulation in the bot-
tom right of Table 3 because it affects the payoff brokers 
receive for pursuing different mortgage outcomes.
Behaviorally Informed 
Credit Card Regulation
Using framing and salience in disclosures 
to encourage good credit card behavior
Credit card companies have fine-tuned product offerings 
and disclosures in a manner that appears to be systemati-
cally designed to prey on common psychological biases—
biases that limit consumer ability to make rational choices 
regarding credit card borrowing.13 Behavioral economics 
suggests that consumers underestimate how much they 
will borrow and overestimate their ability to pay their bills 
in a timely manner.14 Credit card companies can then price 
their credit cards and compete on the basis of these funda-
mental human failings.15 Nearly 60% of credit card hold-
ers do not pay their bills in full every month.16 Moreover, 
excessive credit card debt can lead to personal financial 
ruin. Credit card debt is a good predictor of bankruptcy.17 
Ronald Mann has argued that credit card companies seek 
to keep consumers in a “sweat box” of distressed credit 
card debt, paying high fees for as long as possible before 
finally succumbing to bankruptcy.18
The 2005 bankruptcy legislation19 focused on the need 
for improved borrower responsibility but paid insufficient 
attention to creditor responsibility for borrowing patterns. 
Credit card companies provide complex disclosures regard-
ing teaser rates, introductory terms, variable rate cards, 
penalties, and a host of other matters. Both the terms 
themselves and the disclosures are confusing to consum-
ers.20 Credit card companies are not competing, it appears, 
to offer the most transparent pricing. 
(see, e.g., FTC 2007), in part because brokers’ disclosures 
of potential conflicts of interest may paradoxically increase 
consumer trust (Cain et al. 2005).11 Thus, if the broker is 
required to tell the borrower that the broker works for him-
self, not in the interest of the borrower, the borrower’s trust 
in the broker may increase: after all, the broker is being 
honest! Moreover, evidence from the subprime mortgage 
crisis suggests that while in theory creditors and investors 
have some incentives to monitor brokers, they do not do 
so effectively. 
It is possible to undertake an array of structural changes 
regarding the broker-borrower relationship. For example, 
one could alter the incentives of creditors and investors to 
monitor mortgage brokers by changing liability rules to 
make it clear that broker misconduct can be attributed to 
lenders and creditors in suits by borrowers (see Engel & 
McCoy 2007). One could directly regulate mortgage bro-
kers through licensing and registration requirements (as 
is done elsewhere, e.g., in the UK); recent U.S. legislation 
now mandates licensing and reporting requirements for 
brokers. In addition, the ex post disclosure standard we 
suggest might have a salutary effect by making it more 
costly for lenders when brokers evade disclosure duties; 
this may lead to better monitoring of brokers. 
We also believe it is worth considering fun-
damentally altering the duties of brokers by 
treating mortgage brokers as fiduciaries to 
borrowers.
We also believe it is worth considering fundamentally 
altering the duties of brokers by treating mortgage brokers 
as fiduciaries to borrowers, similar to the requirements for 
investment advisors under the Investment Advisors Act. 
This would, of course, require vast changes to the brokerage 
market, including to the ways in which mortgage brokers 
are compensated, and by whom. We would need to shift 
from a lender-compensation system to a borrower-com-
pensation system, and we would need a regulatory system 
and resources to police the fiduciary duty. An interim step 
with much lower costs, and potentially significant benefits, 
would be to ban yield spread premiums. Banning YSPs 
could reduce some broker abuses by eliminating a strong 
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informed payment choices based on their specific circum-
stances. Such an approach would correspond to changing 
the rules in order to debias consumers with behaviorally 
informed information disclosure, in the top right of table 3. 
Although credit card companies have opposed such ideas 
in the past, disclosures based on the customer’s actual bal-
ances are not overly burdensome. 
Disclosures regarding the expected time to pay off actual 
credit card balances are designed to provide a salient frame 
intended to facilitate more optimal behavior. But such 
disclosures may not be strong enough to matter. The dis-
closures are geared towards influencing the intention of 
the borrower to change his behavior; however, even if the 
disclosure succeeds in changing the borrower’s intentions, 
we know that there is often a large gap between intention 
and action.24 In fact, the borrower would need to change 
his behavior in the face of strong inertia and marketing by 
the credit card companies propelling him to make mini-
mum payments. Furthermore, those market players who 
are strongly opposed to such disclosures would promptly 
attempt to undermine them once enacted with countervail-
ing marketing and other policies.
 
An Opt Out Payment Plan for Credit Cards
A more promising approach, based on default rules estab-
lishing the starting point for behavior, rather than framing 
of disclosures to change intentions, would be to develop 
an “opt-out payment plan” for credit cards, under which 
consumers would be required automatically to make the 
payment necessary to pay off their existing balance over 
a relatively short period of time unless the customer affir-
matively opted-out of such a payment plan and chose an 
alterative payment plan with a longer (or shorter) payment 
term.25 Such an approach corresponds to changing the 
rules through opt-out policies, in the top right of Table 3. 
Given what we know about default rules and framing, such 
a payment plan may be followed by many consumers. The 
payment plan would create expectations about consumer 
conduct and in any event inertia would cause many house-
holds simply to follow the plan. Increasing such behavior 
would mean lower rates of interest and fees paid, and lower 
incidence of financial failure. In any event, confronting an 
optimal payment plan may force card holders to confront 
the reality of their borrowing, and this may help to alter 
their borrowing behavior, or their payoff plans. Moreover, 
credit card industry players would find it difficult to argue 
publicly against reasonable opt-out payment plans and, in 
Going forward, regulatory and legislative steps could help 
prod the credit card industry into better practices. The 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency intervened to 
require national banks to engage in better credit card prac-
tices and to provide greater transparency on minimum 
payments,21 and the Federal Reserve recently released 
proposed changes to its regulations under the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA), in part in the wake of TILA amend-
ments contained in the bankruptcy legislation.22 Under the 
proposals, for example, creditors would need to disclose 
that paying only the minimum balance would lengthen the 
payoff time and interest paid on the credit card; describe 
a hypothetical example of a payoff period paying only the 
minimum balance; and provide a toll-free number for the 
consumer to obtain an estimate of actual payoff time.23 
Although the very length and complexity of the Board’s 
proposal hints at the difficulty of the task of using complex 
disclosure to alter consumer understanding and behavior, 
such improved disclosures might nevertheless help. 
Congress could require that minimum pay-
ment terms be accompanied by clear state-
ments regarding how long it would take, and 
how much interest would be paid, if the cus-
tomer’s actual balance were paid off only in 
minimum payments, and card companies 
could be required to state the monthly pay-
ment amount that would be required to pay 
the customer’s actual balance in full over 
some reasonable period of time
But we could do much better. Congress could require that 
minimum payment terms be accompanied by clear state-
ments regarding how long it would take, and how much 
interest would be paid, if the customer’s actual balance were 
paid off only in minimum payments, and card companies 
could be required to state the monthly payment amount 
that would be required to pay the customer’s actual balance 
in full over some reasonable period of time, as determined 
by regulation. These tailored disclosures use framing 
and salience to help consumers, whose intuitions regard-
ing compounding and timing are weak, to make better 
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late and go over their card limits, in order to obtain fee 
revenue from such occurrences. 
We would change the scoring of the game (corresponding 
to a regulatory choice in the bottom right of table 3). Under 
our proposal, firms could deter consumers from paying 
late or going over their credit card limits with whatever fees 
they deemed appropriate, but the bulk of such fees would 
be placed in a public trust to be used for financial educa-
tion and assistance to troubled borrowers. Firms would 
retain a fixed percentage of the fees to pay for their actual 
costs incurred from late payments or over-limit charges, or 
for any increased risks of default that such behavior pres-
ages. The benefit of such an approach is that it permits 
firms to deter “bad conduct” by consumers, but prevents 
firms from taking advantage of the psychological insight 
that consumers predictably mis-forecast their own behav-
ior with respect to paying late and borrowing over their 
limit. Firm incentives to over-charge for late payments 
and over-limit borrowing would be removed, while firms 
would retain incentives appropriately to deter these con-
sumer failures. 
As with our other proposals, there would be costs as well: 
in particular, the reduced revenue stream to lenders from 
these fees would mean that other rates and fees would 
be adjusted to compensate, and there is little reason to 
believe that the adjustments would be in consumers’ favor. 
Moreover, taxing late and over-limit fees in this manner 
might be seen as a significant interference with contractual 
relationships beyond the form and content of disclosures 
required under TILA for credit card agreements.
Opt Out Credit Card
As a last option to consider in the credit card market, we 
might think about regulation requiring firms to offer a stan-
dard “opt-out” credit card. Elizabeth Warren has argued 
that private sector firms should offer “clean” credit cards 
with straightforward terms and honest pricing.26 We agree 
with her that this would be a significant achievement and 
would set an important example for others. Looking at the 
structure of the market, one wonders whether such a high-
road firm offering a clean credit card could win market 
share and remain profitable. Given predictable consumer 
biases, such firms will have a hard time competing with 
low-road players offering less transparent and seemingly 
“better” offers. We thus wonder whether regulation might 
be designed to reward high-road credit card firms offering 
the face of such plans, to continue using a pricing model 
based on borrowers going into financial distress. 
A more promising approach would be to 
develop an “opt-out payment plan” for credit 
cards, under which consumers would be 
required automatically to make the payment 
necessary to pay off their existing balance 
over a relatively short period of time unless 
the customer affirmatively opted-out of such a 
payment plan and chose an alterative payment 
plan with a longer (or shorter) payment term.
Of course, an opt-out payment plan will impose costs. 
Some consumers who, in the absence of the opt-out pay-
ment plan, would have paid off their credit cards much 
faster than the plan provides, might now follow the 
slower payment plan offered as the default, thus incur-
ring higher costs from interest and fees, possibly even 
facing a higher chance of financial failure. Alternatively, 
some consumers may follow the opt-out payment plan 
when it is unaffordable for them, consequently reduc-
ing necessary current consumption such as medical 
care or sufficient food, or incurring other costly forms of 
debt. While there are undoubtedly problems with such 
an approach, public debate over the proposal would at 
least have the virtue of engaging all relevant players in 
an important conversation about fundamental changes 
in market practice. 
Regulate Late Fees
A narrower intervention based on behavioral insights about 
credit card customers would seek to change the behavior 
of credit card firms, rather than consumers. One problem 
with the pricing of credit cards is that credit card firms 
can charge late and over-limit fees with relative impunity 
because consumers typically do not believe ex ante that 
they will pay such fees. In principle, firms need to charge 
late and over-limit fees to the extent that they wish to pro-
vide incentives to customers not to pay late or go over their 
credit card limits. In practice, given the fees they charge, 
credit card firms are perfectly content to let consumers pay 
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ing. For many low- and moderate-income households there 
is a much greater need to focus on basic banking services 
and short-term savings options, services which, for this 
population, may require a different mix of governmental 
responses than typically suggested in the context of retire-
ment savings for middle- and upper-income households. 
Many low- and moderate-income (LMI) individuals lack 
access to the sort of financial services that middle-income 
families take for granted, such as checking accounts or 
easily-utilized savings opportunities. High cost financial 
services, barriers to savings, lack of insurance, and credit 
constraints increase the economic challenges faced by LMI 
families. In the short run, it is often hard for these families 
to deal with fluctuations in income that occur because of 
job changes, instability in hours worked, medical illnesses 
or emergencies, changes in family composition, or a myr-
iad of other factors that can cause abrupt changes in eco-
nomic inflows and outflows. At low income levels, small 
income fluctuations may create serious problems in pay-
ing rent, utilities, or other bills. Moreover, the high costs 
and low utility of the financial transaction services used by 
many low-income households extract a daily toll on take-
home pay. Limited access to mainstream financial services 
reduces ready opportunities to save and thus limit families’ 
ability to build assets and to save for the future. 
Market forces weaken or break down entirely 
with respect to encouraging saving for low-
income households. This is simply because 
the administrative costs of collecting small-
value deposits are high in relation to banks’ 
potential earnings on the relatively small 
amounts saved, unless the bank can charge 
high fees; with sufficiently high fees, however, 
it is not clear that utilizing a bank account 
makes economic sense for LMI households. 
In theory, opt-out policies ought to work well here, as 
in the retirement world, in encouraging saving by such 
households. However, while in general the market pulls 
in the same direction as policy for saving, market forces 
such cards and penalize low-road firms offering products 
designed to take advantage of consumer failings. 
Consumers would be offered credit cards that 
meet the definition of “safe.” They could opt 
for another kind of credit card, but only after 
meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms 
would face increased liability risk if the disclo-
sure is found to have been unreasonable.
Warren’s innovative suggestion in this regard is for the 
creation of a consumer financial safety commission that 
could review credit card offers.27 Perhaps an entity such 
as this could specify terms and conditions that are “safe” 
and qualify for being offered as a standard credit card. As 
with the home mortgage idea discussed earlier, consum-
ers would be offered credit cards that meet the definition 
of “safe.” They could opt for another kind of credit card, 
but only after meaningful disclosure. And credit card firms 
would face increased liability risk if the disclosure is found 
to have been unreasonable. As with our earlier concept, the 
precise details of liability determination and consequences 
would need to be carefully calibrated. In essence, the pro-
posal would permit firms to continue to innovate in credit 
card practices, but with strong anchoring around straight-
forward practices and with the risk of increased conse-
quences to firms when consumers opt out and wind up in 
trouble. This type of “sticky” opt-out provision, as with our 
proposal for an opt-out home mortgage, would correspond 
to changing both the rules and the scoring of the game on 
the right side of Table 3. 
Increasing Saving Among 
LMI Households
We have focused in this paper thus far on improving out-
comes in the credit markets using insights from behavioral 
economics and industrial organization. Our focus derives 
from the relative lack of attention to this area in the behav-
ioral literature thus far. Savings is also an area ripe for fur-
ther attention, however, because so much of saving policy 
has focused on using defaults to improve retirement sav-
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for financial institutions for offering safe and affordable 
bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr 2004, 2007). 
The tax credit would be pay-for-performance, with financial 
institutions able to claim tax credits for a fixed amount per 
account opened by LMI households. The bank accounts 
eligible for the tax credit could be structured and priced by 
the private sector, but according to essential terms required 
by regulation. For example, costly and inefficient check-
ing accounts with high risk of overdraft or hidden, costly 
features would be eschewed in favor of low-cost, low-risk 
accounts with only debit card access. In particular, bank 
accounts would be debit-card based, with no check-writing 
capability, no overdrafts permitted, and no ChexSystems 
rejections for past account failures, in the absence of fraud 
or other meaningful abuse.
Congress could enact a tax credit for financial 
institutions for offering safe and affordable 
bank accounts to LMI households (see Barr 
2004, 2007). The tax credit would be pay-for-
performance, with financial institutions able 
to claim tax credits for a fixed amount per 
account opened by LMI households. 
The power of the tax credit initiative could be significantly 
increased if it were coupled with a series of behaviorally 
informed efforts to improve take up of the accounts and 
savings outcomes for account holders. For example, banks 
could reach out to employers to encourage direct deposit 
and automatic savings plans to set up default rules that 
would increase savings outcomes. With an automatic sav-
ings plan, accounts could be structured so that holders 
could designate a portion of their paycheck to be depos-
ited into a savings “pocket”; the savings feature would rely 
on the pre-commitment device of automatic savings, and 
funds would be somewhat more difficult to access than 
those in the regular bank account, in order to make the 
commitment more likely to stick. To provide necessary 
access to emergency funds in a more cost effective manner 
than usually available to LMI households, the bank account 
could also include a six-month consumer loan with direct 
deposit and direct debit, using relationship banking and 
automated payment systems to provide an alternative to 
weaken or break down entirely with respect to encourag-
ing saving for low-income households. This is simply 
because the administrative costs of collecting small-value 
deposits are high in relation to banks’ potential earnings 
on the relatively small amounts saved, unless the bank can 
charge high fees; with sufficiently high fees, however, it 
is not clear that utilizing a bank account makes economic 
sense for LMI households. Indeed, the current structure 
of bank accounts is one of the primary reasons why LMI 
households do not have them. 
With respect to transaction accounts, high minimum bal-
ance requirements, high fees for overdraft protection or 
bounced checks, and delays in check clearance dissuade 
LMI households from opening or retaining bank accounts. 
Moreover, banks use the private ChexSystems to screen 
out households who have had difficulty with accounts in 
the past. Behaviorally insightful tweaks are unlikely to suf-
fice in this context; rather, we need to devise methods to 
change the nature of the products being offered and, with 
them, the behavior of the consumers who open and main-
tain the accounts. 
In this area, we need to figure out how to increase scale and 
offset costs for the private sector, in addition to increasing 
saving by low- and moderate-income families. As explained 
more fully below, we propose two options: a new tax credit 
to financial institutions for offering safe and affordable bank 
accounts, and a proposal under which the IRS would direct 
deposit tax refunds into “opt-out” bank accounts automati-
cally set up through private sector financial institutions at 
tax time. Both proposals are designed to induce the private 
sector to change their account offerings by offering tax subsi-
dies or government bundling to reach scale, as well as to alter 
consumer behavior through the structure of the accounts 
offered. The proposals pertain to changing the rules and the 
scoring on the left hand side of Table 3, where markets may 
prove neutral to, or even positively inclined towards, the 
potential overcoming of consumer fallibility. In particular, 
the tax credit and government backing change the scoring 
to firms for offering such products, while the opt-out nature 
of the proposal changes the starting rules.
Tax Credit to Financial Institutions for Offering 
Safe and Affordable Bank Accounts
To overcome the problem of the high fixed costs of offering 
sensible transaction accounts to low-income individuals 
with low savings levels, Congress could enact a tax credit 
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they would significantly reduce the costs of receiving one’s 
tax refund. Once the tax refund account is set up through 
the IRS-mechanism at tax time, households would receive 
their tax refund in the account, weeks earlier than if they 
had to wait for a paper check. Moreover, once it is estab-
lished, the account could continue to be used long past tax 
time. Households could also use the account just like any 
other bank account—to receive their income, to save, to 
pay bills, and the like. 
By using an opt-out strategy and reaching households at 
tax time, this approach could help to overcome consumer 
biases to procrastinate in setting up accounts. By reduc-
ing the time it takes to receive a refund, setting up such 
accounts could help to reduce the incentives to take out 
costly refund loans, incentives that are magnified by tem-
poral myopia and misunderstanding regarding the costs 
of credit. It could dramatically, efficiently, and quickly 
reach millions of LMI households and bring them into the 
banking system. A complementary approach (Koide 2007) 
would reach scale by using prepaid debit cards and pooled 
accounts offered by a more limited number of vendors 
chosen by the IRS, rather than individually-owned bank 
accounts offered by a large number of financial institutions. 
In that manner, the private sector vendor would be assured 
large scale of operations. In either event, opt-out strategies 
and government incentives would be coupled to reach low-
income households with essential banking services.
Conclusion
We have explored how existing regulation fails to take 
account of advances in behavioral research about how peo-
ple think and act. By contrast, behaviorally informed regu-
lation would take account of the importance of framing 
and defaults, of the gap between information and under-
standing, and between intention and action, as well as of 
other psychological factors affecting how people behave. 
At the same time, we argue, behaviorally informed regula-
tion should take into account not only behavioral insights 
about individuals, but also economic insights about mar-
kets. Markets can be shown to systematically favor over-
coming behavioral biases in some contexts, and to sys-
tematically favor exploiting those biases in other contexts. 
A central illustration of this distinction is the contrast 
between the market for saving and the market for borrow-
ing—in which the same human failing in understanding 
costly payday loans. With direct deposit of income and 
direct debit of interest and principal due, the loan should 
be relatively costless to service and relatively low-risk for the 
bank. With a longer payment period than usual for payday 
lending, the loan should be more manageable for consum-
ers living paycheck to paycheck, and would likely to lead 
to less repeated borrowing undertaken to stay current on 
past payday loans. Moreover, the loan repayment features 
could also include a provision that consumers “pay them-
selves first,” by including a savings deposit to their account 
with every payment. Such a pre-commitment device could 
overcome consumer biases to procrastinate in savings, and 
reduce the likelihood of the need for future emergency bor-
rowing. All of these efforts would likely increase take up of 
the banking product and improve savings outcomes from 
becoming banked.
To provide necessary access to emergency 
funds in a more cost effective manner than 
usually available to LMI households, the 
bank account could also include a six-month 
consumer loan with direct deposit and direct 
debit, using relationship banking and auto-
mated payment systems to provide an alter-
native to costly payday loans. 
An Opt Out Bank Account for Tax Refunds
Congress could also enact a new, opt-out “tax refund 
account” plan to encourage savings and expanded access to 
banking services, while reducing reliance on costly refund 
loans (see Barr 2007). Under the plan, unbanked low-
income households who file their tax returns would have 
their tax refunds directly deposited into a new account. 
Banks agreeing to offer safe and affordable bank accounts 
would register with the IRS to offer the accounts, and a 
fiscal agent for the IRS would draw from a roster of banks 
offering these services in the taxpayer’s geographic area 
in assigning the new accounts. On receiving the account 
number from its fiscal agent, the IRS would directly 
deposit EITC (and other tax refunds) into those accounts. 
Taxpayers could choose to opt-out of the system if they did 
not want to directly deposit their refund but the expecta-
tion is that the accounts would be widely accepted since 
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We have sketched here ten policy suggestions derived 
from our conceptual model. In particular, in the home 
mortgage market, we have focused on a standards-based 
truth in lending law, a requirement of full disclosure 
of information favorable to the borrower, changing the 
incentives in the relationship between brokers and bor-
rowers, and a new, opt-out home mortgage system. With 
respect to credit cards, we have explored more salient dis-
closures, an opt-out payment plan, an opt-out credit card, 
and regulation of late fees. We have also suggested ways 
in which behaviorally informed policy might promote 
basic banking and savings beyond the retirement world, 
for example, through an opt-out direct deposit account set 
up at tax time, or through tax incentives to firms to offer 
low-cost accounts. 
It is noteworthy that our current framework largely retains 
the classical perspective of consumers interacting in com-
petitive markets. The difference is that consumers are now 
shown to be fallible in systematic and important ways, 
and firms are now understood to have incentives either 
to overcome such fallibility, or to exacerbate it, in differ-
ent specific market contexts. Recognition of the serious 
social failures that can result from the interaction between 
individual psychology and industrial organization ought to 
lead to a range of behaviorally informed regulation of the 
types that we have described here, in order to restore fair 
and healthy competition. 
and acting upon the concept of compound interest leads 
to opposite market reactions. 
Behaviorally informed regulation would take 
account of the importance of framing and 
defaults, of the gap between information and 
understanding, and between intention and 
action, as well as of other psychological fac-
tors affecting how people behave. 
Rather than relying on the classic model of rational agents 
and maximizing firms, we have developed a model in 
which we understand outcomes as an equilibrium inter-
action between individuals with specific psychologies and 
firms that respond to those psychologies within specific 
markets. As we have seen rather dramatically in the case of 
subprime mortgages, for example, market outcomes may 
not be socially optimal. To the extent that the interaction 
produces real harms, regulation could potentially be use-
fully addressed to the social welfare failures, if any, in this 
equilibrium. Taking both individuals and industrial orga-
nization seriously suggests the need for policy makers to 
consider a range of market-context specific policy options, 
including both changing the “rules” of the game, as well as 
changing its “scoring.” 
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